Property relations and financial markets are key aspects of the transition to a market economy. This paper reviews conceptual analysis and recent experience in these areas under five broad headings: (1) property rights and the legal framework; (2) privatisation; (3) the management and regulation of state-owned firms; (4) banking and finance; and (5) restructuring. The emphasis of the paper is on the view that these apparently different dimensions of the transition are actually closely inter-related, with the result that good policies in one area are necessarily highly dependent on progress with the others. Some of these issues turned out to be more difficult and complicated than appeared at the start of transition, but considerable learning has taken place and better policies can now be designed.
Introduction
Since socialist economies gave little recognition to private property, especially in regard to the private ownership of business assets, and treated the financial system as a passive tool of plan implementation, it is no surprise that property and finance constitutes a central and critical area of transition policies. Accordingly, in this paper we review the subject under five broad headings: (1) property rights and the legal framework; (2) privatisation; (3) the management and regulation of state-owned firms; (4) banking and finance; and (5) restructuring. Section 6 briefly concludes.
Property rights and the legal framework
In order to enable private agents to conduct business efficiently, it is essential for them to hold property rights at least in the output of their firms and preferably in the assets used to produce that output. In addition, agents must be able to enter into business-related contracts that are enforceable through the courts or through some form of accepted administrative arbitration mechanism. Finally, the conditions under which agents are permitted to continue trading need to be specified, as do the requirements imposed upon new agents seeking to enter a given market. These are not especially onerous conditions, but none were satisfied under the highly centralised, socialist planning systems that used to operate in the CEE countries and the FSU.
For this reason, legal reforms to recognise private property in business, to define the main types of commercial entity (limited company, joint-stock company, business partnerships, etc.), to regulate the bankruptcy and liquidation of failing businesses, and to govern entry have all figured in the early stages of transition. Associated with this has been a host of vital, though not especially glamorous reforms in such diverse fields as business accounts, business registration procedures, statistical data collection concerning the business sector, and tax administration. In most countries, such reforms take some time to implement effectively, even when the necessary legislation has already been passed.
commercial codes that were in force between the two world wars, but there has been no such helpful starting point for Russia and the other CIS countries: no one really wants to return to what is emerging from the ruins of central planning is a still rather complex and diverse mixture of laws and decrees emanating from various levels of the governing hierarchy, not practices making use of personal contacts and other links surviving from the old system. The legal and commercial environment for doing business is still evolving. How it evolves may demand for effective legal protection as on the legislators' supply of new laws.
Given the prevalence of monopoly positions under the old system, it was understood quite early that some form of competition policy was also needed to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable ways of doing business. Relevant legislation and suitable agencies have been established in the CEE countries and in the Baltics, with somewhat slower progress in the CIS countries. The new agencies are rarely very strong, and sometimes their efficacy or usefulness are questioned. However, they can best be seen as part of the framework of institutions that helps to create a positive business climate in which firms know they cannot rely on the exploitation of monopoly or other abuses of competition for their business success (see Estrin and Cave, 1993) .
In several countries, property rights have given rise to controversy and remain unsettled.
Nowhere in the region is there yet a fully developed market in private land, though many countries have at least legalised such transactions. However, there are many practical problems to be overcome in the early stages of a land market, to do with establishing initial title (even for state-owned assets, it is important to both to identify the relevant assets and to determine which part of the state is considered to be the owner) and organising some system of registration of title. In most instances the greatest problems have not arisen in connection with industrial assets, but there has been immense resistance to the idea of privatising land, especially if that entails the most developed form in which owners are free to buy and sell land, not only to use it for themselves and their descendants. Thus while some countries decollectivised agriculture very rapidly, sometimes to the extent of allowing the formation of enormous numbers of inefficiently small private holdings, others were reluctant to permit private farming without some limits on land transfers. Similarly, some states have vested all mineral and natural resource rights in the central government to limit the possibilities of uncontrolled private exploitation.
A further aspect of property rights that is conveniently included here is the restitution of state property to former owners as part of the privatisation process. In most of the CIS countries, this is almost a non-issue since most nationalisations took place so long ago, but elsewhere it proved unexpectedly controversial and difficult. Several issues arose: (a) whether to acknowledge the rights of former owners at all; (b) if so, which rights to recognise, what types of property should be recognised, and how to deal with claims; (c) what form of restitution to provide. Each is reviewed in turn.
On (a), it may seem self evident from elementary principles of natural justice, that former owners have rights to compensation in some form and several governments responded positively to this view, partly seeing it as an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a more just, law-based society than had prevailed before: thus restitution could help to undo past wrongs and simultaneously establish a new government's democratic credentials. Against this, however, were several important factors:
• First, the former owners had had several decades to adjust to their losses, most had done so, and it was far from clear that this group was in priority need, given the other demands on post-communist governments' budgets. Moreover, one might have expected the new governments to be looking forward to create the best conditions for a market-type economy, rather than diverting their energies to look backwards.
• Second, it was not always straightforward to compensate former owners without perpetrating new injustices.
• Third, in the case of industrial assets it was not usually possible to identify precisely what was originally nationalised, and hence to distinguish between the contribution of the original owner and the result of several decades of subsequent socialist investment.
• Fourth, as was borne out by the experience of several countries, restitution could give rise to a bonanza for lawyers assisting people to submit and advance claims, while other benefits might be quite modest.
• Last, unless carefully managed, uncertainties over property rights generated by the restitution process could delay privatisation, which could be economically quite damaging.
Despite all these reservations, though, all CEE countries and the Baltic States have passed some form of legislation on restitution 1 .
On the question of which rights to recognise, (b), countries proceeded in stages, starting with those dispossessed in the major nationalisation waves of the 1940s, sometimes moving on to those dispossessed as a result of later political repression. Generally, but not exclusively, only residents and resident organisations (e.g. the church) could submit claims, usually to an office set up for the purpose, and within specified time periods. However, some countries are facing substantial claims from other countries, such as claims from Germans for the houses from which they were evicted in Bohemia (Czech Republic) after the second world war, and a few hundred claims from Italians for houses in Slovenia 2 . It remains unclear how such claims will be dealt with, but most likely they will not be entertained. The assets against which claims could be made included housing, commercial and business assets, some public buildings (e.g. some former church schools in Hungary), and land. Rural land was often dealt with separately under legislation to reform the agricultural co-operative farms.
1. Note that in a few countries this issue was also associated with controversies over citizenship, with full rights not automatically being accorded to Russians resident in some of the Baltic States, such as Latvia.
2
. That issue, interestingly, even delayed the EU's formal offer of an Association Agreement with Slovenia (see section 5), because of Italian objections.
On the form of restitution, (c), the least satisfactory method is usually the physical restitution of the actual assets claimed by a former owner, since that is the approach most likely to entail new injustices or to interfere with privatisation (e.g. if the asset concerned is, as is often the case, part of a larger business entity). However, some countries did pursue this line, including
East Germany (strictly, the New Länder of Germany), though there the policy was quickly modified to include the requirement that the putative former owners must be able to demonstrate their capacity to use the asset productively, failing which only financial compensation could be paid.
The approach adopted by Hungary was more satisfactory, including its recognition of the country's budgetary realities. Thus except for a few special cases, physical assets were not restored at all. Instead, claimants received financial compensation in the form of vouchers (not cash), subject to a fairly low upper limit per claimant. These vouchers could then be used to purchase state-owned assets that were being privatised, including housing (e.g. the apartment occupied by the claimant, if state-owned), shops and other small businesses, and shares in larger firms. Naturally enough, a secondary market for vouchers also quickly developed.
Privatisation
For most economies in transition, usually after the hardest phase of stabilisation has been completed, privatisation forms the centrepiece of their economic strategy. The presumption has been that the incentive structures operating in a private sector economy are more conducive to efficient production, and that in any case the state has revealed itself, over several decades, to be a very poor manager of its business assets. However, as we shall see, none of this implies that simply shifting firms from state to private sectors will suffice to achieve noticeable gains in economic efficiency.
Administratively, most countries have recognised that privatisation is best subdivided into several distinct programmes, to do with small firms (e.g. most shops and service establishments), medium and large firms in industry and construction, and agriculture. The privatisation of small firms has generally proceeded fast and has yielded noticeable benefits in terms of the appearance and content of shops, service standards, and improved availability and quality of many goods and services. These substantial benefits have mostly been achieved by selling or leasing the firms concerned to their workers and managers, sometimes supported by special credits to facilitate such transfers, sometimes supported by vouchers (see below).
Small businesses with hard budget constraints and virtually no support from the state, in an increasingly competitive trading environment, had little choice but to meet the competition, some of it from incoming investors in the domestic retail sector, as in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Hence most of the expected benefits of privatisation could indeed be achieved relatively easily and quickly in this sphere.
For medium and large firms, however, the situation was more complicated, since several problems had to be resolved more or less simultaneously if privatisation were to succeed. It was important, for instance, to clarify the goals of privatisation, since these could affect the design of programmes as well as the eventual outcomes. The natural goal is to improve productive efficiency, typically associated with new management, improved technology, updated products, access to new markets, and frequently also involving outside owners and a good deal of business restructuring. But this goal was supplemented and at times even supplanted in certain countries by other goals: expanding the private sector as rapidly as possible; securing revenue for the government's budget; fostering a broad distribution of business ownership across the population.
In addition to goals, the institutional framework supporting the process also had to be settled, Experience rapidly demonstrated that such agencies would not achieve much if they functioned in a highly centralised, "top down" manner. It generally proved more effective to encourage individual firms or potential buyers (incl. foreign investors) to formulate their own proposals for privatisation, which the national agency would merely supervise and approve.
There are many possible methods of privatisation, and the mix chosen in a given country depends both on the principal goals and on the chosen institutional structure. Some methods also depend on the existence of certain types of financial market, and hence are only feasible in countries with those markets (e.g. a public offering of shares is unlikely to attract much interest unless there is some means of trading the shares). Starting from those usual in markettype economies like the UK, where privatisation has formed a major component of government policy for 15 years, privatisation methods can be classified as in Table 1 .
Most countries have employed a mixture of methods, with sales predominating in countries such as Hungary where the government emphasised revenues and also sought to encourage foreign investment, and free (or almost free) distribution of shares being more prominent in countries where equity arguments and speed were more heavily weighted, such as the Czech 3. Another reason for establishing such bodies was to control the so called "spontaneous" privatisation whereby existing managers basically took control of large amounts of state assets by means of dubiously legal financial manoeuvres such as forming shell companies and other types of asset stripping.
Republic and the Russian Federation.
However, mixed solutions were adopted in several countries, including the last two, since this made it possible to combine free distribution of most shares with the retention of a substantial block of shares in most firms for eventual sale to a new strong owner. The rationale for this is that free distribution alone does nothing to address key issues of transforming the firm through new management and other changes, whereas the mixed solution offers the possibility of more effective corporate governance.
On the other hand, some types of apparently mixed solution can be substitutes for effective policy. Thus Romania set up a State Ownership Fund (SOF) and five Private Ownership Funds (POFs), assigning 70 percent of the value of each state-owned firm to the SOF, 30 percent to one or more of the POFs, the latter being in turn owned by the population through the free distribution of shares in the POFs. At a stroke, therefore, 30 percent of the state-owned sector was privatised, though not a single firm had majority private ownership. Until many of the shares held by the SOF are sold or otherwise distributed, it is hard to regard this as an effective approach to privatisation: its sole apparent merit is its administrative neatness and simplicity, not a very compelling argument in its favour (see Table 1 ). Vouchers issued preferentially to management and workers.
Free distribution of shares to management and workers.
Compensation vouchers (as restitution payment).
Russian Federation, Czech Republic
Russian Federation
Hungary
Mixed and partial models of privatisation
Mixtures of sale and the free distribution of shares Selling off part of a company, the rest remaining in state ownership for the time being
Most countries
Most countries
Debates about, and initial experience with privatisation have given rise to a great deal of conceptual development and controversy, which we now review. The issues that have arisen in this debate concern arguments about the speed of privatisation, the most desirable sequencing between sectors (in other words, what to privatise first), the role of financial institutions in the process (included in section 4), and problems of restructuring (which we defer to section 5 to cover them in a wider context).
Several lines of argument have been put forward regarding the speed of privatisation, of which we consider two here. The first, due to Roland and Verdier (1994) , adopts the political economy viewpoint and constructs a model to show that there is a form of externality associated with the size of the private sector, due to the types of business networks, the extent of competitive pressure, and so on, that arise at various private sector sizes. In particular, with a small private sector, production costs are not unambiguously lower than those achieved in the state-owned sector and there remain possibilities for coalitions to form that could force a policy reversal. In this context, faster privatisation establishes a large enough private sector -a critical mass -to secure the benefits from privatisation, and the most likely coalitions are then likely to favour further privatisation: thus the process not only becomes irreversible but also self reinforcing.
The second argument was developed in Hare (1994) , and is concerned about the ways in which state-owned assets might be sold to new private owners along a plausible growth path for the economy, given assumptions about savings rates by domestic agents, tax rates, agents' willingness to purchase state-owned assets, and rates of foreign direct investment. The analysis shows that for reasonable assumptions about the various parameters, and given the initially stated intentions of certain governments to privatise most state-owned assets within rather short periods (say 3-5 years), the price at which they could be sold is a small fraction of their nominal value: conversely, a slower rate of privatisation permits higher asset prices and hence greater state revenues from the privatisation process eventually. This trade off assumes, of course, that in the meantime state-owned assets are not so badly managed that their initial value evaporates too rapidly.
As for the sequencing of privatisation, one of the obvious questions concerns whether states should privatise first the most profitable companies, or retain these in the state sector while seeking to privatise the loss-makers first. In practice there has not been much choice, since the former category of firm is naturally far easier to privatise than the latter. While this order of privatisation leaves the state with the burden of supporting loss-making firms for a longer period, it has the offsetting advantage of winning support for privatisation, and hence increases the chance that governments will actually be able to complete the process. Another aspect of sequencing concerns the choice of sectors, for instance whether there is any merit in privatising first firms that supply final consumers as against firms that mostly supply intermediate products to other firms. What analysis there has been of this issue, in the context of rather simple, two-sector models, has failed to provide much useful guidance.
Management and regulation of state-owned firms
At the beginning of transition, there was a widespread view that privatisation would be rapid and that those firms which could not be privatised would be shut down. Hence little or no production would remain in state ownership and there would be no call for the state to trouble itself with issues of enterprise management. This view has turned out to be incorrect, both because privatisation has not been implemented as rapidly as expected in most countries, and because certain firms, such as the public utilities, either belong in the public sector (where they reside in many western countries, except for the UK and the USA) or require some form of state regulation. A further reason, discussed below (section 5) is that many state-owned firms are close to bankruptcy: they are usually in no fit state for early privatisation, but require extensive restructuring if they are to survive at all.
If privatisation is less rapid than initially envisaged, for whatever political, administrative and economic reasons might apply in a given country, then large numbers of firms will remain in state ownership for many years. Hence, contrary to assumption, it is actually critically important to devise ways of managing state-owned firms more effectively than in the past, since their performance can have a significant impact on the outlook for the whole economy.
Moreover, the old system of ministerial "tutelage", under which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were subordinated to a sectoral ministry as part of the administrative structure of central planning, is clearly no longer appropriate for these firms. It is important both to separate these firms from the ministerial structure, and to devise ways of governing them that avoid tendencies towards asset dissipation, excessively short-term thinking, and financial indiscipline. Countering this, however, in certain countries SOEs still perform a valuable social function both through the provision of a wide range of social services to their workers and their families, and simply through providing employment and hence a tolerably reliable income source in situations where the alternative social safety net might still be quite inadequate.
In the management of SOEs, two steps appear to be important. The first is to transfer formal ownership rights away from the existing ministry or other government agency into a newly created state property holding company. The details differ between countries, but many have now established such agencies, sometimes to hold and manage virtually all SOEs, including those scheduled for early privatisation, sometimes (as in Hungary for a while) as a body specialising in just those firms that will not be privatised in the near future, or in which the state intends to retain a significant stake. The point of this step is to separate these firms from the ministries that have controlled them in the past in order to cut through many of the informal networks and links that have influenced their activity.
The second step starts to construct a new management and governance structure for these firms, even while they remain formally in state ownership. It does so through a process now widely (if a little confusingly) referred to as "commercialisation". Essentially, this involves transforming the firm into a normal type of joint stock company (all the shares initially being held by the state, of course), with a board comprising representatives of the shareholders, outside interests (such as customers of or suppliers to the firm; possibly also its banker), and sometimes also the existing management and workforce. Sometimes the latter type of representation takes effect through a two-tier type of board structure along German lines, with both a supervisory board and an executive board being formed. However, with the exception of very large firms, this can be quite a cumbersome structure. At first sight, commercialisation sounds like a rather trivial, formal process, but there are some aspects of it that enable it to exert enormous effects on enterprise behaviour if it is properly conducted.
Part of this is the definition of the boundary of the firm, both in terms of what assets it possesses and which state agencies, and which levels of the state structure, are deemed to be the owners of the firm. Under socialism, of course, when virtually everything was state owned, it didn't really matter who had jurisdiction over a particular asset, though a consequence of the resulting blurred boundaries was often a lack of responsibility in the care and use of assets. A useful effect of this specification of firms' boundaries was the establishment of new financial balance sheets for these firms, with the re-defined assets balancing with the financing structure in terms of debt and equity stakes. To achieve the latter, in a form compatible with the firm being able to meet its obligations and continue in business, some financial restructuring may have been required, as we discuss further below (section 4).
Another element of the commercialisation process is to re-specify the firm's objectives along lines more appropriate for a market-type economy. Under central planning, firms were basically supposed to fulfil the prevailing plan and, except in Hungary and Poland, were still receiving detailed instructions each year concerning their plan targets right up to the end of the communist period. Moreover, the notion of "responsibility to supply" ensured that firms had to fulfil their assigned production quotas without regard to their financial condition. There was no threat of bankruptcy, and almost no competitive threat via new entry or import competition. Various financial targets and forms of monitoring were used to counteract the deleterious impact of this environment on enterprises' incentives to produce efficiently.
However, while abuses could be contained in these ways, fundamental change had to await the change of system.
In this context, what commercialisation makes possible is a somewhat greater market orientation on the part of SOEs, associated with an improvement in financial discipline. The latter means that most firms no longer have a legal "responsibility to supply". It also implies that firms are expected to set prices in such a way that they at least cover their costs, that if they cannot do this due to a lack of demand or strong competition then they should cut back, restructure or, finally, go out of business. Further, commercialised firms are required to pay their taxes and social security contributions, and their access to new credit is very limited and only available on normal commercial terms. These are important stages on the way to fostering a much more profit-based business outlook, with firms interested in their markets for inputs and outputs (horizontal links), and in the development of their production, rather than in seeking support from hierarchical superiors as before (vertical links).
Indeed, McKinnon (1994) argued that to strengthen financial discipline amongst established firms, and to make adequate credit available to new ones, the former should be denied access to new credits all together and forced to generate all the funds they needed through internal retentions. Part of his argument was that in the older firms, financial structures and prices were already so distorted that it would be hard even for a well functioning bank to distinguish between good and bad credit risks in this category of firms, and for banks already holding too much bad debt the incentives to go on lending to weak firms would prove irresistible. This is a relatively extreme position, but it has a lot to recommend it. The relevant issues are reviewed further below.
For the firms that remain state-owned, though, the key point is that they should not be allowed to drift without proper guidance. The "state desertion" that has been noted in some countries, and which is an understandable reaction to decades of over-centralised planning, can be extremely damaging. The state still has an important part to play in setting the environment within which these firms can operate; this can most usefully be done along the lines just discussed.
Amongst these firms, there is a group requiring special treatment that goes beyond general measures to do with commercialisation. These are the public utilities, concerned with: energy supply, telecommunications, water supply, and transportation. In western countries, whether the firms concerned are publicly-owned or private, they are invariably subject to some form of economic regulation. This should be the case throughout Eastern Europe, too, though the governments concerned have been relatively slow to recognise the need and to start acting upon it. Now, however, some of the utilities are starting to be privatised and others are being prepared for that step, and this is forcing governments to pay more attention to the policy setting that would be appropriate for such firms.
Historically, public utilities in the CEE countries and the FSU have supplied the population with their services at very subsidised prices. In addition, in electricity supply there is now substantial excess capacity (though sometimes the available capacity is based on very inefficient technical choices), while in telecommunications there is a combination of technical backwardness and immense shortage. In primary energy production, past under-investment and poor maintenance has resulted in supply problems for oil and gas, especially in Russia, while many countries still produce far too much highly polluting and inefficient soft coal. In transportation the picture has been very mixed, with most public transport extremely underpriced, low investment in facilities like airports and ports, poorly developed road networks, and serious concerns about public safety.
In designing new policies for these sectors, it is clearly important to remove the most glaring of the inherited distortions. This entails raising prices so that they are more closely aligned with costs than they were (except, of course, where continuing subsidies can be justified on social grounds) and, in the case of imported energy supplies (mostly oil and gas, but also some electricity), ensuring that domestic prices are also consistent with prices of the relevant imports. For some countries, and especially for households, the required price adjustment represents a significant fraction of personal income, and could cause severe hardship; in such cases there is some justification for a temporary income supplement (or a one-off wage adjustment) to provide limited compensation. However this is done, the important thing is that after the price adjustments the relative price of energy (and most other utilities) should be higher than before, in order to encourage less profligate use than in the past. For some firms, too, these adjustments are difficult. They imply, for instance, that firms in energy-intensive sectors must raise their prices relative to those of other sectors and this can be expected to reinforce the structural change away from such sectors that is already under way.
For the future, prices in the public utilities should promote the efficient utilisation of existing capacities and also generate funds required for new investment. Hence the most appropriate pricing depends to a large extent on the expected investment requirements: as noted above, these are likely to be very different as between primary energy production, electricity, telecommunications and transportation. Even if the industries are not privatised, or are only partly privatised, they should certainly undergo the sort of commercialisation process that was discussed above, in order to separate them from sector ministries and foster more business-like management.
Having taken that step, regulation will still be needed as well for the same reasons as in western countries: namely, that all or part of the major utilities are natural monopolies (or enjoy monopoly power for other reasons), and their ability to exploit their monopoly power must be constrained. We have already referred to the need for more rational pricing, and the need to generate funds for investment. In addition, interconnection rules need to be specified so that competition is feasible even for network utilities, segments of these industries where there is no natural monopoly should be opened up to competition (e.g. equipment to attach to telecommunications networks), and relevant public service obligations need to be monitored.
All countries encounter difficulties in managing these issues in a way that balances the interests of profit-seeking firms against the wider public interest, and Eastern Europe, including the Former Soviet Union will be no exception.
Banking and finance
At the start of transition, none of the CEE countries or the states that emerged from the Soviet Union possessed banking systems that were capable of doing much more than passively support the prevailing plan. None of them had well developed financial markets either, even for government debt, let alone for corporate equities or other types of security 4 . In the early transition years, this was probably the area of policy and institutional reform in which the most serious and damaging mistakes were made, and in which the key issues were least well
understood. An illustration of this is the enormous importance given by most governments to the early establishment of stock markets, something that can only be understood as a symbol of their commitment to create a market economy. In other respects, the early establishment of such markets, often before there was much to trade, or indeed many traders, was extremely risky. For thin trading in a weak stock market is likely to result in highly volatile stock prices, and this does nothing to boost investor confidence in the nascent financial markets.
In this section, we review banking and finance in the transition economies under three headings: (a) institutional reforms and creating new markets; (b) hardening budget constraints and managing bad debt; and (c) corporate governance.
(a) Institutional reforms and creating new markets
First, a brief reminder of the principal functions of banks and financial markets is in order.
These functions are: to provide and manage a given country's money supply (including its relationships with foreign currencies); to provide a payments mechanism; to facilitate transfers of funds from savers to investors across the economy; to provide a variety of assets for savers to hold; to facilitate portfolio adjustments by ensuring that most financial assets are adequately tradable; to assess and monitor the performance of those who borrow from the financial system. Finally, there should be sufficient monitoring and supervision of banks and the 4. Hungary was virtually the sole exception, though even there, the bond market that had operated since 1980 was extremely small. financial system to ensure investor and saver confidence. These are demanding requirements, and probably no country meets them fully.
The most crucial institutional reform for Eastern Europe and the FSU involved transforming the former integrated mono-bank in each country into separate commercial banks, with the remnants of the mono-bank becoming a more familiar central bank, responsible for monetary and foreign exchange rate policies, and largely responsible for supervising the other banks.
For the former Soviet Union other than Russia, and for new states elsewhere like Slovakia, there was of course no central bank, and the institution has therefore had to be created from scratch. At the same time, these countries had to take decisions about their future currencies:
what they would be, how they would be managed, how their value might be pegged to other currencies, and so on. In this regard, a wide range of outcomes can be found, and many of the region's new currencies have not yet been fully stabilised.
Even for performing the simplest domestic transactions, most banks in the region were singularly ill-equipped, with little use of cheques, electronic transfers, cash cards or credit cards of the kinds widely used in western countries, virtually all transactions involving the household sector (including the payment of wages) being settled in cash. While not raising issues of great economic interest or difficulty, it is clear therefore that there is immense scope for a succession of investments in banking services to upgrade product quality and improve the availability of adequate services. Firms were rather better served than households, since they were always required to make all their non-wage payments through the banking system, but even they faced delays and inefficiency in completing transactions.
As in other countries, the main borrowers from the financial system have been firms and the government. However, firms were only able to obtain bank loans and could not issue securities (either debt or equity), and even the government was only able to borrow from the central bank against the emission of currency, an approach that proved highly inflationary in much of the region. Households did also borrow, for instance for house purchase, and this was one of the less unsatisfactory aspects of the old system. Opportunities for lending were far more limited, with almost nothing available to most people and firms other than bank deposits which at best carried a very low interest rate. At a time of almost zero inflation, the accumulation of large savings in the form of bank deposits was not such a bad thing for people to do, but as soon as inflation took off, as it did everywhere at the end of the 1980s, most such deposits were either severely eroded (as in the Czech and Slovak Republics) or virtually wiped out overnight (as in Russia) 5 . Interest rates rarely came close to compensating for the ravages of inflation, and there were no financial assets for people or firms to hold that offered a realistic chance of maintaining or improving their real value.
This situation can only be remedied by the development of new financial markets, in which new types of financial asset (i.e. new to our region of interest) can be created, sold and traded.
Such developments are now taking place extensively throughout the area, usually starting with limited issues of quite short-term (3-6 month) government securities, then extending to shares in firms, especially where these firms are privatised either by initial public offering or via the distribution of vouchers to the population. Finally, firms will be able to issue long-term debt in the financial markets, and other agents, including the government, will issue an increasingly wide range of securities, with longer maturities. As this process unfolds, the demand for transactions in financial assets will increase and so the need for regular, organised markets in which such trade can take place will also expand. It is always possible for some transactions in financial assets to take place through informal business contacts, or with the help of the banks, but this is unlikely to be an efficient solution for very long. Hence the need to develop stock markets, in due course, though as pointed out earlier it is not necessarily wise to do this too soon.
When inexperienced people open new banks or set up new financial markets, they are exposed to even more than the usual risk of financial losses due to mis-management or deliberate fraud.
Consequently, proper regulation of the financial sector, including both bank supervision and oversight of the non-bank financial markets, is crucial. Given the pace of development in some CEE countries or FSU states, regulation has frequently lagged behind the situation on 5. In several countries, this accumulation of savings was regarded as a potentially dangerous "monetary overhang", and at the time of initial price liberalisation it was expected to give rise to strong inflationary pressure. It may indeed have contributed to the inflation that marked this period.
the ground and some quite spectacular financial frauds have been the entirely expected result.
This has included a number of companies engaging in pyramid-type selling to enable them to meet their initial promises of absurdly high returns to early investors (e.g. MMM in Russia, a similar scheme in Romania (Caritas), and many recently collapsed pyramid financing operations in Albania), and many unregulated banks lending vast sums to the enterprises which own them (esp. in Russia). Again, the technical details of the necessary regulation go well beyond the modest limits of this paper, but the point to emphasise is that the issue can only be neglected at great cost.
Once the range of available financial assets expands, and includes assets with a wide range of maturities, other types of financial institution can operate more effectively too. For instance, pension funds, whose liabilities are about as long-term as they can be, need to be able to hold long-term, income earning securities in order to be able to offer their investors reasonably attractive returns. Similarly, insurance companies offering life insurance and other forms of long-term contract need to be able to hold part of their portfolio in long-term assets. Under the socialist system, such institutions either did not operate at all, or were only able to offer very limited types of contract. However, especially as the state seeks to withdraw somewhat from its all-encompassing role as the guarantor of everyone's financial security, there will be an increasing demand for such financial services as people plan to provide more fully for themselves.
(b) Hardening budget constraints and managing bad debt
Under socialism, the banks' role was to keep firms going to enable them to fulfil their plans.
The result was that by the end of the socialist period, many firms were indebted to the banks and were unable to service these debts without receiving continuing subsidies from the state.
Perhaps fortunately, some of these debts were wiped out by the initial, post-transition burst of inflation, but then more were incurred as enterprises struggled to cope with falling domestic demand and the collapse of much of their former trade. As a result, most of the banking systems in the region have had to cope with a serious problem of enterprise indebtedness, in circumstances made unexpectedly difficult by two factors: (i) governments' attempts to cut back the subsidies they paid out to firms; and (ii) the banks' own failure to hold remotely adequate reserves against the eventuality they now had to face. In dealing with the ensuing problems, two basic steps are required: first, to deal with the existing debt; and second, to do so in ways that provide both banks and firms with incentives to behave more responsibly in the future, so that the situation does not recur.
On the first, probably the worst mistake made by many countries was to underestimate the scale and importance of the task they faced in restructuring bank finances, and thus either to delay any attempt at a solution, or to proceed in small steps which conveyed exactly the wrong signals about future behaviour to both banks and firms. The essential point here, is that banks holding large amounts of debt in inefficient firms have an incentive, for balance sheet reasons, to roll over such debt and even to lend more to such indebted firms to keep them going. This process ensured that the poor quality of the debt would not be revealed for at least a while longer. In any case, the large state-owned banks themselves were probably quite confident that they could never be permitted to fail, so even if the unprofitable firms finally failed the banks would be protected. Interestingly, partly due to an awareness of this line of thinking by the banks, some observers of Eastern Europe have even proposed that any bank restructuring should not be done through the old banks at all. Instead, they should be prevented from issuing new credits and left to decay quietly, any new capitalisation of the banking system being based entirely on new banks.
For the firms themselves, somewhat similar considerations operated. They also sought to ensure their survival, and when subsidies from government started to dry up, many borrowed even more from their banks to keep going. Ironically, therefore, some of the first steps towards hardening enterprise budget constraints actually made certain firms riskier for the banks, reducing even further the quality of banks' loan portfolios.
Hardening budget constraints for firms means acting on several fronts simultaneously (see Kornai, 1980) , namely: (1) limit access to credit for anything other than profitable activities;
(2) remove subsidies and taxes that unfairly assist one firm as compared to another; (3) insist that firms must operate in markets that are as competitive as possible to constrain their ablity to benefit from monopoly pricing; and (4) require taxes (incl. social security contributions) to be paid in a timely way. Interestingly, there is some evidence 6 that government action in areas
(1) -(3) has led, in some CEE countries, to increased tax and social security arrears, i.e. to a deterioration in respect of (4). In addition, it is open to countries to signal their determination not to "rescue" unprofitable firms by introducing and implementing a tough bankruptcy law.
However, as the Hungarian experience regrettably demonstrates, this can be overdone. For the Hungarian bankruptcy provisions that came into effect in early 1992 were much the toughest in the region 7 and within a short time over 2000 firms were awaiting attention in the bankruptcy courts. The result was administrative chaos, serious economic losses, and a loss of credibility by the government. No doubt the right signal was sent, but it could have been done at lower cost.
Nevertheless, the general point that budget constraints had to be hardened was scarcely in dispute, and a good deal of survey evidence has been accumulated to the effect that even quite modest restrictions on access to new credits can enforce changes in enterprise behaviour to assure survival, especially when subsidies are also cut back. Naturally, this depends on the credibility of restrictions in the eyes of enterprise managers and their boards, but the point is that firms do appear to behave quite rationally when they understand their situation correctly.
Hence a sufficiently consistent and committed government can make an environment of harder budget constraints for firms effective.
While essential, however, this fails to address the specific problem of enterprise indebtedness and its deleterious impact upon the banks. Hard budget constraints are not finally credible until this problem is dealt with. The banks themselves must be required to build up reserves against future bad debt (perhaps, in due course, to meet the Basle capital adequacy 6 . In a recent, unpublished paper prepared by Mark Schaffer for the European Commission.
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. Also tougher than most western codes, in that they required any firm with any credits overdue by more than 90 days to file for bankruptcy protection. There would then ensue a process of negotiation between the firm and its creditors in the hope of reaching an agreement that would allow the business to continue while satisfying the court. conditions 8 ), though shifting to this position quickly without a substantial capital injection into the banking system entails both a large spread between lending and borrowing rates of interest and a loss of tax revenue for the government (as bank profits are temporarily reduced by reserve provisions). Meanwhile, to deal with the immediate problem, several approaches have been pursued in the CEE countries and the FSU. Probably the least effective approach is just to write off past bad debt, both in state-owned firms and in the banks: enterprise balance sheets are then adjusted by writing down the value of enterprise assets appropriately, while bank balance sheets most probably need injections of state funds to protect depositors. This approach is quick and easy, but it is likely to be expensive because it makes no attempt to distinguish between outstanding loans that could be repaid, and those that could not, and the assertion that such an exercise would never be repeated is unlikely to be believed.
It is more effective to separate the bad debt into another agency -often called a Consolidation
Bank or something similar -only compensating the banks partially for the loans removed from their balance sheets (note that this already gives the banks an incentive to limit the loans they allow to be transferred to the new Bank). The Consolidation Bank then works with individual enterprises whose debt it holds to work out repayment arrangements on the best possible terms. In extreme cases the firms concerned might be forcibly restructured or even shut down, though for firms that are judged viable, some of the original debt can be cancelled. The point about this procedure is that it elicits co-operation from the agents involved and signals that bad debt is unavoidably painful. This helps to create better incentives in the future. For this approach to work well, it is important that it be applied on a sufficient scale, and be implemented consistently and firmly: Hungary, for instance, proceeded along sensible lines but initially underestimated the scale of the problem and has therefore had to introduce three stages of financial consolidation. Eventually, the problem will be dealt with, but almost certainly at higher cost than would have occurred otherwise. In contrast, both Slovenia and the Czech Republic have been more successful 9 .
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. These conditions, agreed at the Bank of International Settlements based in Basle, provide that banks should hold reserves equal to at least 8% of their appropriately risk-weighted loan portfolio.
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. A recent World Bank study reviews experience in this area in some detail. See Borish et al. (1995) .
(c) Corporate governance
The commercialisation and eventual privatisation of most former state-owned firms was initially presumed to deal with the problem of corporate governance, partly by establishing a broadly competitive environment within which firms had to operate, partly by hardening budget constraints, and partly by establishing suitable new management and supervision arrangements for the firms concerned. However, different methods of privatisation result in very different ownership structures, and these in turn have implications for corporate governance that we now briefly discuss 10 .
The main issue that emerges from most countries' early experience with privatisation is the relatively modest importance of outsider control, such as by dominant outside shareholders, in the newly privatised firms, and the correspondingly greater role of insider privatisation. The balance between insider and outsider control and the precise mix of privatisation methods employed vary somewhat between countries, as we have already indicated in the discussion of privatisation itself. But the predominance of insider control in most countries is undeniable.
Moreover, there were good reasons for this outcome, in that it was probably the only feasible way of securing worker and manager co-operation in the privatisation process, it permitted privatisation to proceed rapidly, and even where voucher privatisation was the main method, the dispersion of shares across the population ensured that blocks held by management and workers would most likely be controlling, so that this, too, turned out to be a form of insider privatisation.
Should we regard insider privatisation as problematic, from the point of view of corporate governance? (see Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1993) . Fundamentally, this depends on whether the insiders seriously see themselves as maintaining the firm as a going concern, or whether they are merely concerned to extract from it what they can in the short term, with eventual 10. For a fuller analysis, including some detailed country studies and German and Japanese comparisons, see Aoki and Kim (1995) . For a review of the specific issue of employee share ownership, see Nuti (1995) .
closure not far ahead. The latter case, incidentally, is not necessarily such a bad thing provided that banks are sufficiently prudent not to extend additional lending to firms following such a strategy, and provided also that the firm in question does indeed have little prospect of a return to profitability. Thus this aspect of insider privatisation, involving asset-stripping and running down non-viable firms, can be economically efficient provided that the banks are sufficiently able and motivated to provide proper monitoring.
For those firms expected to continue in business, the issues are a bit different. In general, corporate governance is concerned with the control problems that arise when management in a firm is delegated from the board representing its owners (i.e. the separation of ownership and control), and also with the procedures for resolving conflict amongst the firm's stakeholders, the latter including the workforce, the managers, the firm's bank, as well as the equity shareholders. In the case of worker and management control, difficulties arise largely because these groups both own capital (shares) and are stakeholders as well, and their interests in the two roles may conflict. For instance, there can be a tendency in such firms to over-pay and over-employ workers, thereby limiting the returns available to other actual or potential owners, and limiting the firm's ability to secure additional funding from the capital market.
This kind of difficulty can be alleviated by a number of mechanisms, such as by ensuring that workers own enough shares to give them a strong interest in the return to capital, and by encouraging an active role for banks in monitoring and supervising firms' behaviour. The feasibility of the last point depends, of course, on how far financial reform has progressed in a given country. However, it is clearly important since there will not be many firms in the transition economies for which it will be possible to rely on control by outside shareholders as the principal channel of corporate governance.
Restructuring
Restructuring is one of the more confusing terms that can be found in the literature on transition, so it is crucial to start with definitions. First, the term is used at a variety of levels, to refer to structural change for the whole economy, for broadly defined sectors or industrial branches, or for individual enterprises. At the economy-wide and sectoral levels, restructuring involves shifts in the commodity structure of output that can be expected to result from the implementation of a broad range of transition policies. There are certain to be permanent changes in economic structure at these levels, including shifts in favour of services and away from heavy industry. However, these are not our concerns here. Instead, we focus on restructuring at the level of the individual enterprise.
At the enterprise level, there can be financial restructuring and real restructuring. The former refers to changes in the enterprise's debt-equity ratio, or its ownership and financial structure more broadly considered, and some aspects of this have been referred to above. Here we are only interested in real restructuring. This involves a number of elements: unbundling of assets, closure of non-viable units, disposing of social assets, reorientation of workers' and managers' incentive structures, and new investment to modernise equipment (Aghion, et al., 1994) .
Measures of this kind are needed in order to transform a typical state-owned firm into a firm capable of succeeding in a competitive, market-type economy. Many of these elements are quite normal in market-type economies, too, and are going on all the time as some firms expand, others adjust to market decline, yet others enter new market segments, and so on.
What is special about the CEE countries and the FSU, therefore, is not whether these activities can be found, but the vast scale on which they are needed and the initially unfavourable market and institutional environment within which they are occurring.
At the start of transition, real restructuring attracted relatively little attention because it was taken for granted that it would be carried out efficiently and expeditiously by whoever turned out to be the new owners of a given firm, post-privatisation. However, this assumption only appears to be justified in the minority of cases where a new, foreign owner takes control of the firm, or where particularly able and imaginative local owners assume control. Further, it was also argued that such restructuring should not be carried out by government prior to privatisation, since most governments in the region almost certainly lacked the ability to do the job well. Now, though, the predominance of insider control in privatised firms, and continuing weaknesses in financial markets, have raised questions about the adequacy of such a "hands off" approach to restructuring. Moreover, the fact that some state-owned firms are so heavily indebted and continue to run up enormous losses means that privatisation can hardly be considered until at least some restructuring has been done, in these instances both financial and real.
In dealing with these situations the most effective approach is to create incentives for managers, workers, and potential new owners to undertake the necessary restructuring, in other words to adopt a fairly decentralised approach. This can be done by hardening budget constraints and hence increasing the financial pressure on firms. Also, either imposed privatisation should be delayed somewhat in order to give existing managers a real stake in the fruits of their current restructuring activity, or some way should be found of assuring them of a stake in the privatised firm. The latter, of course, runs the risk of entrenching bad managers, but in many cases the existing managers may only have appeared "bad" because they were responding rationally to inappropriate incentives in the old system. With a better designed incentive system they may be able to perform well, and they do have the advantage over other agents of knowing the firm very well. Managers, too, are likely to be concerned about their career prospects and their professional reputations, as Kornai has emphasised before, and this is a factor likely to encourage them to pursue serious restructuring in order to signal their competence as managers.
While it is important to strengthen incentives for restructuring in these ways, it is also important not to permit substantial resources to be dissipated in support of restructuring firms all or part of which cannot be made viable within a reasonable period and/or at tolerable cost.
In particular, to the extent that firms seek outside support to finance their restructuring, a number of considerations come into play.
One is the observation that in western countries, the most common initial response of firms that need to undergo restructuring (e.g. because of an unexpected change in their market, causing a year or two of severe losses) is a mixture of consolidation and down-sizing. They rarely seek substantial new finance until this process is already well advanced, and this is important for the financial markets since it signals commitment to the restructuring process and makes financial institutions more willing to lend at a later stage. The same is likely to be the case in Eastern Europe. Second, banks should not be lending to firms merely to enable them to pay their wages or other current costs except as part of a restructuring programme whose financial projections are approved by the bank. When they do lend to restructuring firms, monitoring and supervision should be close, not unlike the procedures commonly put in place in western firms when they seek protection from creditors under the bankruptcy law.
Third, if for social reasons, rather than as part of an economically well-founded restructuring programme, the government wants to see particular firms survive for longer than they otherwise would, then the necessary subsidies should not be paid via the banks. It is crucial that the banks increasingly act as profit seekers, developing their capacity to appraise and monitor profitable enterprise projects. They should not be used as agents of the government's social policy.
Conclusions
This paper has shown that improving enterprise performance in the transition economies involves several inter-related elements. Privatisation has a significant part to play in the story, but by itself it cannot deliver the needed results as it must be combined with banking and financial market reforms, restructuring, and other measures. Amongst the other measures are arrangements and institutions to encourage the development of the de novo private sector (not discussed in the present paper), and policies to improve the performance of those firms likely to remain in the state sector for a substantial period. The latter is especially important as in many countries privatisation is turning out to take rather longer than was originally expected.
Whether our concern is with private sector or public sector firms, it is increasingly evident that efforts to strengthen corporate governance are crucial for the success of transition programmes.
